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Our first national political association, after the revolutionary patriots, 
was the Federalist Party, which controlled the Federal government for 
twelve years, and then dwindled rapidly away. Within its brief career this 
Federalist Party managed to go through three quite distinct phases, each 
of which revealed a different composition of members and of principles. 
While these are visible enough in the detailed histories of the early na-
tional period, they have not been clearly marked in our textbooks. An 
appreciation of the distinctness of each phase should reduce some of the 
confusion about what the party stood for in the 1790's, where Jeffersonians 
have succeeded in attaching to it the reactionary social philosophy of 
Hamilton. Furthermore, an identification of the leading traits of Feder-
alism in each of its three phases will clarify the corresponding traits in the 
opposition to Federalism. 
i. federalism as nationalism, 1785-1789 
The dating of this phase is arbitrary, but defensible. Programs for 
strengthening the Articles of Confederation were a favorite subject of 
political men before Yorktown. In 1785 a national movement began to 
form. Several delegates met in that year at Mount Vernon to negotiate 
commercial and territorial conflicts between Virginia and Maryland. In-
formally but seriously they also discussed the problem of strengthening 
the national government. These men joined with nationally minded lead-
ers from other states to bring on the concerted movement for a new 
Constitution.1 
The interesting questions raised by Charles Beard about the motives 
of these Federalists have partly obscured their leading concerns, and the 
scholarship of Merrill Jensen has perhaps clarified the matter less than it 
should have. These scholars have caused us to be preoccupied with the 
question of who was going to rule among the economic classes of the 
United States, and Beard especially framed the issue as being between 
landed and commercial interests. But as later critics have demonstrated, 
Beard did not prove that the Constitutional Fathers were as clearly in the 
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commercial class as his reasoning would indicate. The two great Virginia 
nationalists, Washington and Madison, represented the interests of plant-
ers and western land developers. At that time they supposed their inter-
ests to be identical with those of the American mercantile community. 
Professor Jensen has quite clearly established that the United States was 
improving rather than declining in the 1780's in the fundamental fields of 
political order, productivity, commerce and population. Nor should the 
short but severe depression in the middle of the decade and the local dis-
orders be particularly blamed on the Articles of Confederation. Under 
the supposedly more perfect government of the Constitution of 1787 we 
had whiskey rebellions, western conspiracies, financial confusion and seces-
sionist plots quite as alarming as the troubles of the 1780's. Our leading 
nationalists had determined on a more centralized system of government 
well before Daniel Shays took up his musket and besieged a court house. 
Depression and disorders did, of course, prepare the public to support 
constitutional changes.2 
The leading concern of the original Federalists was the complex field 
of foreign relations. In the 1780's the United States continued to have a 
colonial economy, so that there was no important economic question that 
was not at the same time a question of foreign policy. John Adams, with 
a bankrupt and disarmed government behind him, could not persuade the 
British to sign a commercial treaty with their former colonies, nor could 
Thomas Jefferson do much better with our allies, the French. The result 
of this diplomatic futility was that the trade of the United States was more 
thoroughly in the hands of British capitalists in the 1780's than it had 
been in the 1760's. Most infuriating was the exclusion of United States 
ships from the British West Indies. This rigorous application of the Brit-
ish Navigation Acts meant that now only British ships could carry Ameri-
can grain, timber, salted meat and livestock to these numerous and needy 
customers.3 
Even the signs of increased prosperity alarmed Americans who saw 
their growing trade managed and directed for the profit of a reviving 
British Empire. Furthermore, without an army or the money with which 
to raise one, the Continental Congress could not press our claims to the 
Northwest Territory, which the British and their Indian allies held firmly, 
if quite in defiance of the Treaty of Paris of 1783. Nor could Congress 
challenge the Spanish in their defiance of the boundaries we claimed in 
the Southwest, their refusal to allow to our western settlers the free navi-
gation of the Mississippi, and their influence over the southwest Indians. 
Few Americans lived or traded West of the Appalachian chain, and by no 
stretch of the imagination could the Atlantic settlements be considered 
crowded. A conservative statesman, John Jay, would willingly compro-
mise the western claims of the United States in the interest of peaceful 
commerce. But Jay was not typical of the men who dominated American 
politics. As William Appleman Williams has argued, the effective rulers 
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of the United States before 1829 were determined mercantilists, by which 
he means men who believed that the United States should expand to be-
come a full-grown mercantilist empire. It was this ambitious design which 
united such diverse patriots as John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas 
Jefferson and George Washington. They wanted commerce and agricul-
ture, expanding territories and domestic manufactures. In their moments 
of exalted vision they saw the American system engrossing all of North 
America, or even all of the western hemisphere.4 
The leading Federalists of the Constitution-making era understood 
that Britain and Spain were weak in North America because they retained 
only minor outposts of their empires here, but the United States was weak 
because of defective political arrangements. The challenge tackled by the 
founding fathers was simply to find some ingenious way of preserving the 
freedom of the American people, while marshalling their great material 
resources for common purposes. The opposition to the Federal constitu-
tion was based on fear that it could be exploited to reduce the liberties 
and wealth of the people; it was commonly attacked for failing to guard 
this or that particular interest. But we should notice that several features 
of the Constitution were scarcely challenged at all: its provisions for a 
national revenue, a national military force, a national commercial policy, 
and, as a consequence of all of these, a potentially vigorous policy toward 
the British, the Spanish and the Indians. 
There remained one group of Americans, powerful in influence 
though not in numbers, who supported the new Constitution without see-
ing in it the means for developing an autonomous, western-hemisphere 
American Empire. These were the gentlemen of the eastern cities trading 
in British goods and American staples. By the standards of the world in 
the eighteenth century these men were progressive enough, but the aston-
ishing events of the French Revolution were to leave them celebrated as 
conservatives in history books. Some of them had been cautious Patriots, 
others had been Tories. But after 1783 all were in favor of reintegrating 
the economy of America with that of the British Empire. This was by no 
means a treasonous notion, for it looked forward to a partnership of 
equals, rather than the nettling subordination which the ministers of 
George III had tried so distressingly to maintain in the years preceding 
independence. The British supplied the best manufactured goods on the 
most reasonable terms. They were in other ways uplifting and desirable 
neighbors. They had an established church, but permitted freedom to dis-
senters; certain classes were privileged, but all classes enjoyed valuable 
liberties and opportunities for advancement; crime, vice and misery 
plagued town and country, but organized charities fought them with in-
creasing devotion and technical skill; the British had become the world's 
foremost slave traders, but were also now becoming the world's outstand-
ing abolitionists. 
Madison, Jefferson, and Monroe, all good American Nationalists, 
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would see Britain as a foe of enlightened progress in the 1790's, and would 
identify the cause of human liberty with that of France. They supposed 
that their pro-British countrymen were political reactionaries. In fact, 
the Anglophiles of America overwhelmingly looked to the liberal trading 
classes of Britain, and admired their cautious and civilized humanitarian-
ism, their drift toward freer trade, their religious toleration and their sup-
port of upright personal and public finance. The England of their ideal 
was responsibly progressive, and moving away from rural Toryism, the 
Royal Prerogative, narrow Anglicanism, commercial monopoly and the 
slave trade. 
There were friends of the United States among English radicals—Price 
and Priestley are examples. But the important pro-American party in Eng-
land was composed, reasonably enough, of merchants and bankers special-
izing in the American trade. These men, led by the Barings, advocated 
that the United States be given the enjoyment as an independent nation 
of almost all the economic advantages earlier enjoyed in the condition of 
dependency. Obviously the more a friendly disposition toward Britain 
developed in America, the more the pro-American group could advance 
conciliatory measures in the British government. When the United States 
twisted the lion's tail, the pro-American party was obliged either to keep 
quiet or be denounced as disloyal.5 
ii. washingtonian federalism, 1789-1800 
George Washington's command of his own administrations has been 
obscured by the dramatic doings and impressive rhetoric of his principal 
minister, Alexander Hamilton. The importance of Hamilton has been 
further exaggerated by the political tactics of the opposition, who sensibly 
directed their attacks against the vulnerable Secretary of the Treasury 
rather than the venerated President. Washington's political technique 
itself removed him partly from the arena of political contention: he sug-
gested policies more often than he proclaimed them, he sought advice 
from all sides, he avoided personalities, and he left time for deliberation. 
Of all his secretaries, Hamilton was the most erratic, but also the most 
talented and, in a way, even most loyal. Hamilton, Madison, and Jeffer-
son all tried to steer Washington in the making of foreign and domestic 
policies, but none fully succeeded. Hamilton was more successful than 
the Virginians because he did not instigate public attacks on the admin-
istration when it failed to follow his own wishes.6 
But Washington was in charge of his administrations, and his Feder-
alism was distinctly neither that of Hamilton nor that of Madison, but a 
superior combination of both. Hamilton represented the point of view 
of the Anglophiles, a group increasingly disliked and distrusted by Mad-
ison and Jefferson, and yet, as Washington saw, an indispensable part of 
the community. This group supported the financial program of funding, 
of assuming the states' revolutionary debts, and of creating a central 
26 
bank. The Anglophiles naturally viewed the French alliance as at best 
a sometime convenience, and certainly not as a permanent and para-
mount factor in American diplomacy. Hamilton was himself one of the 
most ardent members of his own party, actually favoring a full commer-
cial and military alliance with the British. Madison and Jefferson, on 
the other hand, believed that the United States could achieve full com-
mercial and territorial satisfaction from the British Empire by a combi-
nation of closer relations with France and coercive acts of trade and navi-
gation directed against the British.7 
The foreign policy of Washingtonian Federalism may best be 
summed up in the word neutrality, which represented a middle course 
between Hamilton's desired English alliance and the Republicans' (as 
they came to call themselves) desire to wage commercial warfare. Hamil-
ton was determined to avoid war with the British, and wrote, in defense 
of his policies, some of the longest political tracts celebrating the advan-
tages of peace over war. Yet Hamilton was willing enough, in defense of 
his principles, to fight western Pennsylvanians, Frenchmen, Spaniards 
or even the Jacobins of Virginia. Jefferson and Madison, on the other 
hand, were so convinced of the utter reliance of Britain on American 
markets and raw materials that they denied their proposed measures of 
commercial coercion would produce war. Later experience proved them 
wrong, but to themselves and their followers they appeared a peace-lov-
ing group. 
In the twentieth century the word neutrality has acquired connota-
tions of passiveness, uninvolvement and even irresponsibility, and Wash-
ington's Farewell Address has been quoted in defense of isolationism. 
But isolationism was impossible to a nation whose territory and trade 
were still vulnerable to the ambitions of three imperial powers. And 
Washington's neutrality was a policy of strength, even compared to 
Hamilton's or Madison's, for the great powers had only contempt for 
neutrals who would not fight for their independence. Whether the offend-
ing power was Britain, France, Spain, or a tribe of American Indians, 
Washington would with equal patience initiate negotiations of the friend-
liest sort possible, while at the same time seeking a military force adequate 
to the emergency if negotiations failed. Preserving and strengthening the 
American union was the highest political goal that could be realized in 
Washington's lifetime. 
Washington agreed with Hamilton on the value of funding, banking, 
a large and growing trade, and a permanent military force, but in long-
range objectives he agreed with Jefferson and Madison. This was espe-
cially true with respect to his dedication to the developmen of the Amer-
ican West, and the binding of it to the Atlantic states by roads, canals, 
and equal rights in government. Like so many of Washington's political 
goals, this one of building up the trans-Allegheny west had originated in 
private ambition. He had been one of the first Americans to cross the 
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mountains and fight the French for possession of the heart of the Ameri-
can continent, and continued to develop his lands on the Ohio to the end 
of his life. Ever patient, Washington did not press as demanding a diplo-
macy against either Britain or Spain as did the later Virginia presidents, 
but he was demanding enough. He insisted on nothing less than full 
United States sovereignty in the Old Northwest and Southwest, and the 
free use of the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico, and these diplomatic 
goals were obtained during his second administration.8 
Washington also shared with the Republican leaders a long-range goal 
of American economic self-sufficiency. There is widespread misunder-
standing on this question of who advocated the rapid development of 
American manufactures, because of the inconsistency of the two most fa-
miliar figures of the early republic, Jefferson and Hamilton. Professor 
Williams, for one, has solved the riddle.9 Jefferson, after all, declared 
many times that it was better for Americans to be farmers, and import 
what manufactured goods they needed from European workshops. But 
that was not his language all the time, and it was certainly not his behav-
ior. Jefferson, like Washington, took a deep and lifelong interest in me-
chanical improvements and American industries. Jefferson hated poverty, 
filth and crowding, those noisome products of the early industrial revolu-
tion; but he loved machinery and science. As a tourist he always sought 
new inventions to admire, and so, of course did Washington. Washington 
approved of Hamilton's Report on Manufactures; the Republicans did 
not attack him for it. 
For Hamilton the Report on Manufactures represented a flirtation. 
Neither before nor after its preparation was he an ardent advocate for, or 
student of, industrialization. To protect American manufacturers would 
be to some degree to exclude British, and to diminish the import-export 
merchants who were the rich, well-born, and wise in Hamilton's political 
universe. After Washington retired Hamilton dedicated himself to po-
litical and military ambitions, not to technological advancement. During 
the presidency of Adams Hamilton labored for the full-blown military 
and commercial alliance with Britain which Washington had sensibly 
avoided, while Adams was opposing French aggressions with Washing-
tonian firmness and patience. Under Washington, the merchants had 
supported the policy of neutrality; Adams was firm enough against the 
pretensions of the French so that they might have supported him too. But 
Hamilton split the party by supporting the extreme Anglophile-Franco-
phobes and denouncing John Adams. Divided, the Federalists lost con-
trol of the nation, never to regain it.10 
Before considering the last phase of Federalism, let us summarize the 
Federalism of George Washington, as continued by John Adams. In for-
eign policy Washington aimed at the expansion of our territory and trade 
and the preservation of peace and independence by fair and patient nego-
tiations, supported by an army and a navy. Domestically he favored the 
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balanced economic growth of all sections of the country, but especially an 
increasing interdependence among them, and relatively less dependence 
on foreigners. He favored the conservative trading classes, but then taxed 
trade and applied much of the income to securing the West. The signifi-
cant opponents to Washingtonian Federalism shared his long-term objec-
tives, but disagreed so strenuously over means as finally to suspect the com-
tence or the good intentions of Washington himself. 
By the end of the Federal Decade Alexander Hamilton had become 
less the leader of his party than an uncontrollable destructive force within 
it. He challenged President Adams in his constitutional role as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces, he disputed the President's authority 
in foreign affairs, and in 1800 issued a printed assault on the President's 
character which was probably indictable under the Sedition Act of 1798. 
There is no excusing Hamilton in this crisis. His President had firmly 
prepared the nation to defend itself if necessary, and, fully in the spirit of 
his predecessor, had patiently sought a peaceful diplomatic remedy for 
our troubles with France. There was a perfectly real and serious threat 
to the United States during the Adams administration, for the increasingly 
powerful French nation was both attacking our commerce and improving 
its plans to reoccupy Louisiana. It was foolish of Republican leaders to 
write these facts off as the libels of a subversive Anglo-monarchical party, 
but so far as they were foolish those leaders were also ineffectual. Adams 
had the majority of the nation behind him in the French crisis. Hamilton, 
Pickering, and the rest of the Anglophile Federalists had come to their 
own delusion, which was that the Republicans were not merely misin-
formed about French intentions, but were conspiratorially involved with 
revolutionary France in a plot to subvert American liberty. Rather pa-
thetically, these Federalists, after helping prepare the nation to defend its 
rights, cast themselves in the role of strident and inept censors. It was not 
merely that they dosed the American nation with taxes, navies, standing 
armies and the Alien and Sedition Acts. All of those, including the limi-
tations on the freedom of the press, had been borne during the Revolu-
tion, and would be borne again during later national emergencies. What 
hurt in Hamiltonian-Pickeringian Federalism was the manifest desire to 
make of these emergency measures a permanent system, for it was embar-
rassingly clear that these men deplored the passing of the war emergency. 
iii. reactionary federalism, 1800-1815 
"We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists," declared Thomas 
Jefferson in his First Inaugural, thereby inviting the followers of Wash-
ington and Adams to join in harmonious support of his own administra-
tion. Jefferson helped create the first two-party system in the United 
States, but he did not believe in it. He intended to cast the worst of the 
Anglomen into political obscurity and bring the rest of the nation into 
tranquil cooperation. The successes of his predecessors and the European 
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peace made it possible for Jefferson to remove internal taxes, reduce the 
military and honor the public debt. Friendly relations with England im-
proved our trade, and this under the terms of the once-hated Jay Treaty. 
During the years of Jefferson's greatest successes, the name Federalism 
became corrupted by the fanaticism of several of its most visible leaders. 
It was in this third phase, for instance, that Federalism became synony-
mous with a kind of defensive political elitism. With the nation enjoying 
unprecedented prosperity and security in 1804, Hamilton was despondent 
about "our real disease, which is democracy."11 Worse, Hamilton was ex-
perimenting in his last years with a project for mixing public piety and 
conservative politics in a proposed Christian Constitutional Society, in 
which both sound religion and sound politics might be made to serve the 
interests of each other. The political essays of Fisher Ames, widely re-
printed in Federalist papers, brought a pessimistic and insulting view of 
the character and morals of the American people to their attention.12 
To this sour attitude a few of the leading Federalists added the notion 
of disunion. The perennial advocate of this was Timothy Pickering, who 
had been the outstanding sponsor of the Sedition Act of 1798. Men of 
tolerant views may say of Pickering as they have said of Jefferson Davis, 
et al., that there is nothing so absolute in politics as to make the idea of 
dissolving the United States immoral. Nevertheless, the idea of a separa-
tion of the states was horrible to the greatest Federalist, Washington, and 
was quite unpopular even among Pickering's friends. But Pickering was 
not read out of the party because of his eccentricity, and, given a more 
receptive audience for his ideas because of the unpopularity of the War of 
1812, he finally pushed them, if not to the lunacy of secession, at least to 
the futilities of the Hartford Convention. 
After 1800 Federalists distinguished themselves by voting against the 
Louisiana Purchase, and thereby increased their reputation for being ene-
mies of the western settlements of the United States. They were sectional, 
not national in their outlook, just as they were elitist, not majoritarian. 
All that was constructive, progressive, and optimistic in the Federalism of 
the first and second phases had now been adopted by the Jeffersonian Re-
publicans, at least in the sense that the majority party found positions of 
respect and influence within itself for a diversity of interests and pro-
grams. Thus Tench Coxe and Mathew Carey, our leading advocates of 
industrialization, were both good Republicans in the 1800's. Albert Galla-
tin, the eminently Republican Secretary of the Treasury, became a parti-
san of the Bank of the United States. Jefferson himself proposed the 
application of surplus revenues, at a time when he could anticipate them, 
to the construction of roads and canals to bind the West to the East, and 
he revived Washington's plea for a national center for learning. While 
Republicans were promoting such civilized projects, leading Federalists, 
the former authors of neutrality laws in the early years of the French Rev-
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olution, were supplying equipment to the Spanish-American revolutionist, 
Francisco cle Miranda.13 
It is surely unkind to characterize post-1800 Federalism by the extreme 
doctrines of Timothy Pickering and Fisher Ames, but the party invited 
such characterization by allowing them such eminence in their councils. 
The third-phase Federalists, to do them justice, did manage to function as 
a responsible opposition on some issues, and where Jeffersonian statecraft 
was weakest their criticism was most sensible. From the first concerted 
assault on American shipping in 1805, the Federalists maintained that 
there was but one way to defend one's commerce, and that was to arm. 
Had this reasoning been followed, the United States might have been pre-
pared for the War of 1812, and being so prepared might not have felt 
compelled to declare it. Confronted with several trained regiments of 
American troops near the Canadian border, the British government 
might well have removed some of the causes of war in time to avert it, 
especially if American arming had been attended with a patient and con-
ciliatory diplomacy. The Federalists' willingness to arm was partly a po-
litical tactic, aimed not at beating back the pretensions of Britain, but at 
voting down embargoes. Nevertheless, however devious their motives, 
their advice was sound. Under Washington and Adams embargoes were 
scarcely used. Therefore international trade continued in spite of its lia-
bilities, producing the vital import revenues with which the government 
could finance its program of military preparations. This, in turn, sup-
ported a firm diplomacy which, perhaps as much as was possible, reduced 
the European restrictions on American trade. 
The embargoes of Jefferson and Madison, by contrast, failed to pro-
duce the swift and decisive capitulation of the British or the French that 
had been intended, and produced great distress and disaffection at home. 
That this distress was ultimately blamed on the British in most sections of 
the country made the policy of commercial restriction not a civilized sub-
stitute for war but, as the Federalists had correctly predicted, a goad to-
ward it. And restriction sapped our ability to prepare for war. 
Once war was engaged, too many Federalists refused to support the 
very military preparations they had pretended to advocate in earlier years. 
The younger Republicans, on the other hand, adopted the Federalist con-
tempt for commercial restriction and adopted the un-Jeffersonian view 
that armies and even navies might be instilled with Republican virtue. 
So by the end of the War of 1812 the Federalists had as a party thrown 
away their last sensible position, the notion embodied in the first and sec-
ond phases of Federalism that to pursue a successful foreign policy a na-
tion must be armed, and that to be armed it must have a reliable revenue 
and a manageable currency. By the time these principles had become com-
pletely absorbed into Republicanism, Republicanism had become com-
pletely the Federalism of Philadelphia in 1787 and of Washington's 
presidency, modified only in degree by the rapid democratization of man-
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ners characteristic of the times, and by the eager expansiveness of the 
younger generation. Federalism as a name lingered in the declining sea-
ports of New England, a relic of an eighteenth-century age when the 
wealthiest and most influential citizens were those engaged in the British 
trade.14 
The fading of the name did not mean the disappearance of all the men 
who had marched under it during its varied career. John Marshall's 
greatest years came after 1815. Rufus King, William Plumer and Harri-
son Gray Otis were moderate enough to see that the Republican Party, 
after all, served the national interest. John Quincy Adams had supported 
the Louisiana Purchase and even the Embargo; his Federalist credentials 
destroyed, he was henceforth to be classified with Republicans and—he 
lived so long—Whigs. Even Timothy Pickering survived the party he had 
helped destroy, and lived to lend the doubtful charm of his endorsement 
in 1828 to the Hero of the WTest, Andrew Jackson.15 
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